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GEORGE H. DESSIONt
RECALLING Bentham's assertion that the grand jury had been per-
forming no useful function since the beginning of modem prosecu-
tion, and remarking the unanimity of modern expert studies to the
same effect, the Report on Prosecution by the National Commission
on Law Observance and Enforcement concludes:
"that under modern conditions the grand jury is seldom better than a
rubber stamp of the prosecuting attorney and has ceased to perform or
be needed for the function for which it was established and for which it
was retained throughout the centuries; that . ... an unnecessary work
burden upon the administration of justice . . should be lightened by
eliminating the necessity of indictment and permitting prosecution to be
instituted and accusation to be made through the simpler processes of
information." 1
Twenty-four of the states had already-in some instances long before
-abolished the traditional requirement of indictment in felony prose-
cutions. The draftsmen of the American Law Institute's Code of
Criminal Procedure had recently embodied in it a recommendation
that the remaining jurisdictions follow suit.2
But the grand jury was still not altogether without friends.
Charges that the use of indictment dissipated responsibility by
cloaking prosecutors who ought to come out in the open were coun-
tered by suggestions from many that, as put by Charles H. Tuttle,
then United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York:
"The prosecutor who is conscious of his heavy responsibility will
be glad to have it shared by a body representative of the com-
tAssistant Professor of Law, Yale University: See the author's article, v.ith
Isadore H. Cohen, The Inquisitorial F2ctions of Grand Jurics (1932) 41 YALE
L. J. 687.
1. (1931) 124.
2. CODE OF CRIINAL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED FiNAL DiL%'T (Am. L. Inst.
1930) Introductory Note to c. 4.
[163]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
munity." a His successor in office, George Z. Medalie, added with
particular reference to federal grand juries: " . . . in many sections
of the country Washington is regarded more or less as a distant
agency. Unless the people through their own representatives are
able to voice the local sentiment concerning the law, and the local
sense of justice, they will feel decidedly insecure, and the Grand Jury
is the particular body that breathes the spirit of the community." 4
The growth of a number of voluntary grand jurors' associations in
such outstandingly urban and industrialized centers, among others,
as New York City and Chicago, offered tangible evidence of the
vitality of the institution.8 In addition, there were, in the experience
of many prosecutors and ex-prosecutors, certain concrete collateral
advantages afforded by grand juries regularly available to the State
in investigating and building up its cases.
The draftsmen of the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal
Procedure accordingly sought further proof to support their codi-
fied preference for an information system, "some more objective
standard than opinions, even expert opinions." 8 Data were collected,
under the direction of Professor Raymond Moley on behalf of the
Social Science Research Council, from court records in the inform-
ation states of California, Connecticut, Indiana and Michigan. For
comparison with these, data were taken from criminal justice sur-
veys in the grand jury states of Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania
and Virginia. Further evidence was secured, under the direction
of Dean Wayne L. Morse, through a questionnaire drawing replies
from 545 judges of 41 states; and through reports on various aspects
of 7,414 felony cases presented to grand juries, made out by 162
prosecutors of 22 states. On conclusion of this project Professor
Moley reported that: "The evidence revealed by this study supports
the contentions favorable to the information . . . . when all allow-
ances have been made, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
use of the information seems to be more efficient, economical and
expeditious." 7
The conclusions advanced after this survey must, however, be read
in connection with their accompanying 'hedging clause':
3. Reported in (1929) 7 THE PANEL No. 1, at 8.
4. Medalie, Grand Jury's Value - Presentments - Fraudulent Bank-rupts
(1931) 9 THE PANEL No. 2, at 16.
5. Dession and Cohen, Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 687, 711, n. 98; Davis, Grand Jurors Federation of America Organ-
ized in Chicago (1932) 10 THE PANEL No. 3, at 30.
6. Moley, The Use of The Information in Criminal Cases (1931) 17 A. B.
A. J. 292.
7. Id. at 294.
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"The statistical method followed .... does not yield a final definitive
answer to the questions under consideration. This should be fully
acknowledged and understood. Vast numbers of pertinent factors cannot
be subjected to statistical analysis..... It is useful in providing "leads"
for further intensive study. It gives lines which if followed will yield
new and important light upon problems of administration. It is also useful
in verifying impressions gained in other ways, such as empirical obser-
vation, etc. It is in this restricted sense that this whole exposition is
offered. It provides evidence, not an answer. It does not purport to
prove anything. The student of this subject may interpret the data we
offer in whatever way his inclinations direct." 8
However, accumulations of data on those points which did lend
themselves to the method-i.e., speed, economy of operation, effi-
ciency and rubberstamping, even in the artificial sense in which
these had to be defined in response to the exigencies of the data-
are apt to be quite disproportionately influential. Here, as elsewhere,
the imponderable encountering the ponderable is likely to be honored
chiefly in gesture. In the whirl of discussion eddies come into being,
sweeping together those tangible, measurable particles of data into
masses which catch the focus of attention, relegating the incoherent
intangibles to the out-of-focus. It is the familiar process by which,
under compulsion of a feeling that the mind must be made up regard-
less, a problem susceptible of varied pose is transformed into a set
of conventional issues which can be answered on the data at hand.
Attention on both sides to date has, moreover, been concentrated on
the alleged shortcomings of grand juries. The alternative program
-initiation by information-has been much less scrutinized.
Consider, for example, the curious obscurity of the objective sought
to be realized by the information proposal. From observations like
the following out of the Wickersham Report on Prosecution one
might infer that no longer is any preliminary check on prosecutors
desired: ...... the grand jury had its real justification in the system
of private prosecutions which never obtained in the United States.
.... There was no need of such a check in a regime of public prose-
cutions." 9 Such an inference would, however, apparently be too
hasty, for elsewhere the Wickersham Commission records consider-
able dissatisfaction with the personnel, facilities and conduct of the
office of prosecutor in our states. 0 The leading advocate of the in-
8. Moley, The Initiation of C7iminal Prosecutions by Indictwnt or Informa-
tion (1931) 29 MIicH. L. REv. 403, 410-412.
9. 1 REPORT NATIONAL CoIzuIssIoN ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFoncErn=
(1931) No. 4, at 34.
10. Id- at 6-27.
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formation writes in the same vein: "Politics, embodied in the prose-
cutor, administers the criminal law, for its own objectives, and in
its own image," I" and negatives the suggestion that all preliminary
checks on prosecution be removed (by permitting the prosecutor
himself to conduct the preliminary examination of an accused) in
the observation that: "It is doubtful whether such a change would
make it possible to provide the proper kind of control over the pre-
liminaries to trial by a responsible person." 12
From what source, then, is this "proper kind of control' to ema-
nate? By a process of elimination it must be the magistrate's pre-
liminary examination, the notion held by Jeremy Bentham and in-
corporated in the Wickersham Report on Prosecution as follows:
"Even where the accusation may be initiated through the grand jury, as
a matter of actual practice a predominant percentage of the cases also
receive a preliminary hearing in a municipal, police, magistrate's, or similar
tribunal. Consequently a predominant percentage of the cases which reach
trial will have gone through two preliminary trials or hearings, namely
the preliminary examination and the grand jury presentation. A goodly
percentage of those which do not reach trial will also have gone through
these two preliminary hearings." 18
Professor Moley and other critics of the grand jury accordingly
characterize it as a "useless repetition" of the preliminary examina-
tion.' 4 One is again cast into doubt, however, on encountering the
following passage by Professor Moley:
"The value of the preliminary examination as a means for getting down
the testimony of witnesses in a dependable record, and early in the prose-
cution, is negligible. In a great many of the magistrates' courts no steno-
graphic record is made at all.... A casual, careless and unintelligible pre-
sentation of evidence precedes a hasty guess of judgment .... The most
serious side is that the confusion that is present at the preliminary hearing
does little to protect the public interest against back-stair wire-pulling
and fixing. . . .Machine politics is always heavily entrenched in the in-
ferior courts .... Nearly everyone in the system believes the preliminary
hearing to be practically unnecessary. The police, feeling that a large
number of well-prepared cases is unjustly dismissed and that the others
are carried through more by chance than plan in the preliminary hearing,
are bitterly antagonistic toward the magistrate and seek every means to
bring their cases directly before the grand jury or prosecuting officer." 15
11. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (1929) 94.
12. MOLEY, OUR CRIMINAL COURTS (1930) 36.
13. Op. cit. supra note 9, at 124.
14. MoLLY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 138.
15. MoLY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 29 et seq.
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Much the same version is presented in the various crime survey
reports, rural justices of the peace faring quite as badly as the urban
magistrates.' 6
At this point one begins to wonder whether the question is not,
after all, one of selecting a scapegoat. As a proceeding in the name
of raising standards it would not be unprecedented, and in many
respects the grand jury affords a convenient subject. Its emotional
appeal as a bulwark against tyranny is not what it was, now that
the publicized breakdowns of law enforcement against racketeers
and the diversion of popular interest from the county courthouse
to other sports have inclined us to think less of the historic cases
of Shaftesbury 17 and Swift '8 and more of the mortality and delay
table. Dismissing such an interpretation, however, is there perhaps
reason to believe that preliminary examination, despite its dubious
aspect, does after all offer a promising mode of control of the pre-
liminaries to trial? The conceptions of criminal practice and policy
embodied in this belief on the part of many adherents to the inform-
ation are, for the moment, more arresting than the factual evidence
adduced against initiation by indictment; for out of those conceptions
were framed the issues about which the evidence clusters, the stand-
ards by which it is proposed that the relative merits of grand jury
and information systems be judged. An analysis of these in the
light of existing practice will accordingly be attempted, and there-
after the evidence adduced against grand juries re-examined.
CONTROL THROUGH PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
With the New York City expos6 of its magistrates courts barely off
the front page and the continuing barrage from crime commissions
and Professor Moley directed against rural and urban committing
justices alike, deficiencies in the calibre of our various types of
magistrates courts have surely been sufficiently publicized. But
these are not the sole, or even the major, obstacles to realization
through preliminary hearing of any adequate protection to the
accused and control of prosecution in this stage. Probably much
more in point are certain obstacles of a legal order, vaguely hinted
by the Wickersham Commission: "None of the surveys contains a
definite facing or discussion of the problem of the need for, and ap-
propriate function of, the preliminary examination under modern
American urban conditions." 19
16. Dession and Cohen, op. cit. supra note 5, at 712, n. 100.
17. 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681).
18. See CoTrTa, JUSTICE CRIAxNmINxE N ENGLETErRE (2d ed. 1822) 54.
19. Op. cit. supra note 9, at 121.
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In the absence of any "definite facing or discussion" it will not
be surprising if the magistrate's examination, in role and purpose,
turns out to be little different in a jurisdiction embracing the inform-
ation than in one adhering to the indictment; i.e., a procedure which
has always presupposed a subsequent grand jury hearing and check.
In practically all indictment jurisdictions, including the federal, the
holding of a preliminary hearing (or securing of a waiver) and
subsequent bindover has never, despite the wish of the New York
Code Commissioners of 1848 that it might be otherwise, 20 been re-
quired as a condition precedent to the further progress of felony
prosecution. A prosecutor may accordingly ignore this step com-
pletely, initiating prosecution in the first instance by securing an
indictment or filing an information. If a preliminary hearing hap-
pens to be held and the adcused discharged, an indictment may still
be found against him and the accused brought in on a bench warrant.
If bound over, the prosecutor may still-aside from possibilities of
nolle-ing or pigeonholing the case-change the bindover charge to
one more or less serious in drafting the information or securing the
indictment. The same situation prevails in some of the information
states.
Besides the power of the prosecutor thus to avoid a preliminary
hearing or to circumvent its effect, there must be taken into account
certain strategic considerations inevitably influencing the conduct
of both sides at this stage, and thereby further determining the na-
ture of the preliminary hearing. From the prosecution point of view,
any real disclosure of its case so early in the game would as a rule
prove disadvantageous, aiding the defense immeasureably in con-
cocting plausible versions to explain away the evidence, in framing
alibis, and in "reaching" the key witnesses of the government. From
the defense point of view rather similar considerations obtain, and
so little is required in any case to establish probable cause for bind-
over that it would rarely be a profitable stage in which to fight on
the merits.
2'
Aside from these strategic considerations, it would be imprac-
ticable in most cases to expect prosecutors to be present at prelim-
inary hearings, so long as justices of the peace are scattered through-
out counties, and municipal or police courts throughout large cities,
at considerable distances from one another and from the offices of
the district attorneys. It would also be impracticable to assume
any thorough investigation and preparation of the case on the part
20. FOURTH REPORT OF THE NEw YORK COMMISSIONERS ON PRAOTION AND
PLEADINGS (Code of Criminal Procedure 1849) xxxvii.
21. A situation exceptional in this regard is presented in People v. Ilebberd,
96 Misc. 617, 162 N. Y. Supp. 80 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
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of the state at so early a stage, in view of the more or less prevail-
ing notion that preliminary hearing ought to follow immediately upon
the heels of arrest.22 Suppose, however, that the practice be adopted
by magistrates of regularly postponing hearings, pending investiga-
tion and decision by the district attorney, and that arrangements be
made for him to be represented at all the hearings-a system which
has been adopted in a few localities. The relationship between mag-
istrate and prosecutor, in terms of comparative prestige, influence,
information about the case and responsibility for its outcome, renders
it inevitable and desirable that the magistrate should, as a general
proposition, follow the prosecutor's recommendation.
All these circumstances, coupled with the prosecutor's power to
omit altogether or circumvent the effects of a preliminary hearing,
combine to force the magistrate in felony prosecution to emerge as
an official whose chief functions comprise merely the issuance of
warrants for search and arrest, fixing of bail, and affording the
police an opportunity to relinquish accused persons from their tem-
porary custody and thereby to terminate any possible liability for
false.arrest and imprisonment. While thus in part a convenience
to the police, the preliminary hearing is also intended as a partial
protection to the accused from incomm.nieado detention by the police,
as witness general and rather futile statutory provisions command-
ing that arrested persons be brought before a magistrate "forth-
with," or "as soon as possible," or "within a reasonable time." 3 But
as a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the case for the protection
of the accused and in the interest of an early sifting of the wheat
from the chaff-the sole aspect and specific function involved in the
common assertion that grand juries merely duplicate preliminary
hearings-the magistrate's examination under common law rules and
legislation of the type now under discussion, can scarcely be regarded
as seriously conceived.
24
22. REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OF THE NATIONAL COmt-
MISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (1931) 33.
23. These are summarized in CODE OF CRIMINAL PRoCEmun, TENTATIVE
DRAFT No. 1 (Am. L. Inst. 1928) 117, 177.
24. The following administrative patterns from different jurisdictions serve
to illustrate the rle of the non-compulsory magistrate examination:
Type 1 (a Western federal district wherein distances are great): When
a person is brought before the Commissioner charged with committing a crime
and arrested at a point far distant from the Commissioner's office, he is im-
mediately bonded-or, if he cannot raise bail, committed to jail-and the hear-
ing continued over. No prosecuting attorney is present and no witnesses are
heard at this stage. In the meantime the prosecutor is likely to secure an
indictment and, in some instances, even have the case finally disposed of in
the district court. The Commissioner then makes his report, usually in the
form "bonded to appear before the district court'. The recorded date of dis-
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The adoption in many of our states of an information procedure
was coupled with no departure whatever from the conception of
preliminary hearing outlined above. In seven of these there is still
no requirement that the filing of an information be preceded by a
preliminary hearing (or waiver) and commitment.25 In the remain-
ing eighteen information states, however, one does find either con-
stitutional or, more frequently, statutory acknowledgment of the
novel and magnified significance attached by the justification of the
information in felony cases to the preliminary hearing before a com-
mitting magistrate.2 The requirement is in some instances subject
to exceptions, as (1) where the information is filed with leave of
court, or (2) where the accused is a fugitive from justice, or (3)
where the accused is a corporation, or (4) where the offense is com-
mitted during or just previous to the term of court wherein the
information is to be filed.
27
Is the role of the committing magistrate now substantially altered
and squared with the premises of the usual argument for the inform-
ation procedure? It is obvious that this will depend entirely on the
spirit read into the general requirement by the courts as they dis-
pose of detailed procedural disputes. The possibilities are richly
varied, as may be illustrated by the vagaries of a single jurisdiction.
After the adoption of California's constitutional requirement of
preliminary examination in all felony cases to be prosecuted on in-
position by the Commissioner in this district is accordingly often subsequent
to the date of disposition in the district court.
Type 2 (an Eastern metropolitan federal district where distances are negli-
gible): When an accused is brought before the Commissioner he is at once
bonded and the hearing automatically continued over for one week. An assist-
ant district attorney is present to make a recommendation as to the amount
of the bond. In the meantime the prosecutor's office begins its investigation
of the case. At the expiration of the week the hearing is denied, if not waived,
and the case actually initiated by the securing of an indictment or the filing
of an information.
Type S (a New England rural county): Preliminary examinations are con-
ducted by justices of the peace scattered throughout the county. No prosecuting
attorney is as a rule present at these hearings, and in the usual case the charge
first comes to the attention of the State's Attorney's Office after the hearing
has been held and the bind-over papers forwarded. In drawing up his informa-
tion the prosecutor is influenced not at all by the magistrate's disposition,
framing the counts as his own judgment dictates from the evidence available
and all the circumstances of the case. When convenience dictates a prosecution
is initiated in the first instance by filing an information or securing an indict-
ment, the preliminary hearing stage being omitted altogether.
25. Op. cit. supra note 23, at 349.
26. Id. at 345 et seq.
27. Loc. cit. supra note 26.
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formation,28 the courts of that state took the view that nothing in
the general requirement prohibited a district attorney from charging
in his information offenses not specified in the magistrate's order of
commitment, so long as they were based upon the evidence adduced
at the preliminary hearing.2 In People v. Nogiri, however, the
Supreme Court of that state called a halt, interpreting the consti-
tutional requirement as 'follows:
"The result of these [earlier] decisions is to vest in a ministerial and
executive officer-the district attorney-supervisorial, appellate, and judi-
cial powers controlling the judgment of a judicial magistrate, who alone,
under the Constitution, is empowered to hold the e.xamination, and who
alone is empowered to declare by his commitment the offense for which
the accused person shall be put upon trial. . . It is to be remembered
that the examination and commitment by a magistrate for a felony is but
substituted process for the action of the grand jury in finding an indict-
ment, and the district attorney occupies no higher nor different place in
the one mode of investigation than he does in the other." .0
The legislature was thereafter moved to attempt an express statutory
authorization of the practice declared unauthorized in the above
decision. 31 The validity of this statute was questioned in a series
of cases before the District Courts of Appeal, -32 until finally, twenty-
seven years after the Nogiri decision, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia expressed itself in People v. Bird as of the opinion that:
"Whether the action of the district attorney in the Nogiri case, . . . was
contrary to any constitutional provision of the State was a question which
28. Art. I, § 8 of the California Constitution reads: "Offenses heretofore
required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by information,
after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment by a magistrate, as may be pre-
scribed by law."
29. People v. Lee Ah Chuck, 66 Cal. 662, 6 Pac. 859 (1885); People v.
Vierra, 67 Cal. 231, 7 Pac. 640 (1885); People v. Giancoli, 74 Cal. 642, 16 Pac.
510 (1888). A commentator on the constitutional provision in question, dis-
cussing the proceedings of the constitutional convention of 1878, relates that:
"After most of Art. I, section 8 had been passed, one of the members proposed
a 'mere verbal amendment', which added the present center of controversy, the
phrase, 'after examination and commitment by a magistrate'." (1931) 19 CALW.
L. REv. 330, 331.
30. 142 Cal. 596, 76 Pac. 490 (1904).
31. Sec. 809 of the PENAL CODE, as amended (Statutes 1927, at 1045) pro-
vides that the information "may charge the offense, or offenses, named in the
order of commitment or any offense, or offenses, shown by the evidence taken
before the magistrate to have been committed." (Deering, 1931).
32. People v. Barnett, 99 Cal. App. 409, 278 Pac. 885 (1929); People v.
Sanders, 102 Cal. App. 237, 283 Pac. 136 (1929); People v. Linton, 102 Cal.
App. 608, 283 Pac. 389 (1929).
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obviously did not receive the consideration to which it was entitled ...
If a state may, consistently with due process, dispense with the preliminary
examination entirely and authorize the prosecutor to initiate the criminal
proceeding (Lem Woon v. Oregon, supra), it is difficult to perceive why
the state should be denied the power through its Legislature to authorize
the district attorney to designate the crime to be laid in the information.
Certainly Section 8 of Article 1 of our Constitution does not work such a
denial for it does not provide that the magistrate shall have the power to
designate the crime, much less the exclusive power to do so. When the
magistrate has concluded that a crime has been committed and that there
is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, he has performed
his function under the common law practice . . .
In the same opinion it was also observed that "An examination of
the cases in other jurisdictions discloses at most that they are not
altogether in harmony."
There are, then, these fundamental differences in spirit of ap-
proach to what is otherwise the same general requirement of a
preliminary hearing. But something more than a change of spirit
is involved in the transition from the Nogiri to the Bird decisions
in California. The court in the former case appears to have assumed
that a change of rule could happily transmute the comparatively in-
significant preliminary hearing into something approximating that
of the grand jury. Here was indeed a pouring of new wine into old
bottles. The institution of committing magistrate had not, like the
grand jury since prosecution became public, been designed or re-
modeled with a view to any wielding of this magnified power and
responsibility. The magistrates are still for the most part scat-
tered justices of the peace and petty city tribunals or police courts,
33. 212 Cal. 632, 639, 300 Pac. 23, 26, (1931). On a complaint for murder,
the accused herein was committed for manslaughter. The district attorney
filed an information for manslaughter, and then moved for leave to amend so
as to charge the defendant with murder. This application and a subsequent
one were denied, after which the district attorney's motion to dismiss the
information was granted. On a new complaint for murder the defendant was
again committed for manslaughter by a second magistrate. The district attor-
ney then filed an information charging murder. Defendant's motion to sot
aside the information was denied, after which he was tried and found guilty
of manslaughter, from which conviction he appealed. Affirmed.
A certain limitation which might be read into Section 809, as amended, Is
suggested by the following dictum of the court in this case, at page 28: "It
is conceivable that the action of the district attorney might be without the
pale of the legislative sanction. For instance, if the defendant should be com-
plained against for grand theft and be informed against for bigamy, because,
forsooth, there might be testimony before the magistrate that the defendant
was guilty of the latter crime, a serious problem might be presented." Of.
People v. Wyatt, 8 P. (2d) 901 (Cal. D. C. App. 2d, 1932).
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It is still impracticable for the district attorney to be represented
at all these hearings; tactical considerations would still militate
against any full presentation of the state's case at this early stage.
Contrast the grand jury. In place of scattered justices we have
one body sitting at the county courthouse. The prosecutor is in at-
tendance, directing the state's case, drafting the bills of indictment,
and in general acting as legal adviser. Unlike the hearing before
a magistrate, a grand jury session is ex partc and more or less
secret,34 whereby possible tactical objections to disclosure are ob-
viated. Under all the circumstances, it is clear that bindover charges
are apt to be too sketchy, untenable or impolitic, to warrant their
being accorded the finality of indictments, i.e., the carefully framed
charges to which accused persons are to plead and on which they
must be brought to trial, if at all. On the other hand, how recognize
this impracticability of requiring conformity between the magis-
trate's order of commitment and the prosecutor's information with-
out completely whittling away the significance attached by proponents
of prosecution on information to the preliminary examination?
In order to determine what has happened to the preliminary hear-
ing under information procedures-the extent to which it may be
regarded as a check or control on prosecution-it will be necessary
to review detailed practices and rulings in the premises. Given some
requirement as to preliminary examination like section 8 of article I
of the California Constitution, or section 115 of the American Law
Institute Code, questions then arise, first, as to how far a prosecutor
may depart in framing his information from the magistrate's order
of commitment; second, as to how far a bindover obligates a prose-
cutor to file an information; and third, as to how far a dismissal by
the magistrate prevents a prosecutor from proceeding further. The
rulings on questions such as these determine the true role and sig-
nificance of preliminary examination in an information procedure.
All else is fiction.
The first question posed goes to the heart of the matter. The im-
practicability of attempting, as in People v. Nogirl, to place com-
mitting magistrates on a par with grand juries in their relationship
to the prosecutor was demonstrated by an experience culminating
in People v. Bird and apparently acknowledged in section 117 of
the American Law Institute's draft Code: 'henever a defendant
has been held to answer at a preliminary examination, . . . the
prosecuting attorney shall file an information charging the commis-
sion of an offense according to the evidence presented at such exami-
nation. . . ." Of the remaining information states, five are in
34. But cf. the limitations to secrecy discussed by Kidd in Secrecy vs. In-
spection of Grand Jury Minutes (1928) 6 THE PAxIE No. 1, at 4.
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accord with People v. Bird,35 six more, having no requirement what-
ever as to any preliminary examination, accord still wider discre-
tion to the prosecutor,36 and only six appear to restrict him in draft-
ing his information to the bindover charges, or to the complaint
before the magistrate.
37
With respect to the second question, the answer is substantially
the same as in the case of an indictment. In a number of the inform-
ation states, once a person has been bound over, the prosecutor is
required to file in writing his reasons for not desiring to file an in-
formation; whereas in others the matter resides entirely in his dis-
cretion.38 In the event of a dismissal at preliminary hearing the
situation is rather different from that where a grand jury has no-
true-billed. In many of the information states the prosecutor, acting
in conjunction with the court, is here accorded more leeway, as
recommended by the American Law Institute's draft Code: "If upon
the preliminary examination the defendant is discharged, an inform-
ation may be filed against him only by leave of court." 3D
Professor Moley suggests: ". . the thing that is necessary
is a magistrate of much greater significance than the present one
;" and adds "... with authority to control the whole process
of conducting the hearing, accepting bail, and, to some degree, con-
trolling the preliminary activities of the prosecutor." 40 Herein may
lie the explanation of that seeming inconsistency between the brief
for the information, on the one hand, and the harsh views of magis-
trates elsewhere expressed by some of its advocates on the other.
In discussing preliminary examination under the information sys-
tem reference is had to some development in futuro-not a familiar
justice of the peace on a fee system nor again one of those recently
removed New York City magistrates. For purposes of comparison
the grand jury is usually portrayed in its actuality-that last col-
lection of more or less ordinary fellows impanelled at the county
courthouse. Is this magistrate "of much greater significance" even
now in process of being evolved whilst the grand jury institution
rests static, or is this but an opposing of actuality with ideal?
In the rank of widely urged and familiar proposals, there are the
several programs for centralization of inferior courts, in some in-
stances in consolidation with trial courts and under the supervision
35. op. cit. suprra note 23, at 359.
36. State v. Myers, 8 Wash. 177, 35 Pac. 580 (1894); State v. Pritchard,
35 Conn. 319, 326 (1868) semble; op. cit. supra note 23, at 349.
37. Op. cit. supra note 23, at 358.
38. Id. at 354.
39. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, OFFICIAL DRAFT (Am. L. Inst. 1930)
c. 4, § 116.
40. Loc. cit. supra note 12.
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of administrative chief justices.41 Where the fee system remains
there are proposals for its abolition. In New York City, Judge
Seabury has proposed that the appointment of magistrates be taken
from the mayor entirely and vested in the Appellate Divisions of
the Supreme Court.42 Many of the advantages of such changes are
obvious. Judgeships can be made more attractive and important.
Better facilities can be provided, and the various functions of a
centralized court departmentalized. The keeping of more adequate
records-a continual accounting of the business of the court-is
facilitated, to bear fruit as tfie accumulation indicates desirable rules
of court and legislative changes in procedure. The trial of petty
cases and the administration of bail are bound to be benefited.
These are attractive features, but do not particularly advance our
present problem. For the difficulty in controlling prosecution of
felony cases through the preliminary hearing lies not primarily in
the laxness resulting from decentralization or in the low calibre of
justices on a fee system as in the very uncertain niche left by our
procedure-and in particular that portion dealing with the powers
of the prosecutor and his relationship to other agencies in the process
-for preliminary examination of any significant kind. If the ex-
amination is not absolutely required a prosecutor will still omit,
dominate, or over-ride it in cases where he has arrived at a decision
of his own. Nor will the defense be less apt to waive this hearing
than now in cases where a fight is to be made later in the trial court.
If the examination is required, how far will a centralized court alter
the California situation discussed above? The following comment
on the workings of Detroit's centralized court is suggestive: "But
very few respondents want an examination and the prosecuting
attorney has found the examination unnecessary from the state's
position. The preliminary examination is a relic of pioneer condi-
tions. It serves but a limited purpose in a unified court which pro-
vides a trial speedily." 43
CONTROL THROUGH THE GRAND JURY
In view of the foregoing difficulties in the way of envisaging any
noticeable control of prosecution through the magistrate's hearing,
the contemporary dissatisfaction with our prosecuting authorities
already noted might readily appear to furnish a justification of the
41. Galloway, Reform of Magistrates' Courts (1931) 1 EDITORIAL REE%ARCH
REP. 237, 251.
42. See MOLEY, TRIBUNES OF THE PEOPLE (1932) 246.
43. HARLEY, D-m'orr's NEw MODEL CRIMINAL COURT (1921) 11 . Cnmn.
LAw AND CRIm. 398, 405.
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grand jury. Unlike a committing magistrate under one of the pre-
vailing types of information system, a grand jury is amply endowed
with legal powers for the exercise of its function as a lay leaven of
bureaucracy, a check on corruption, and in general a citizens' agency
for overseeing and controlling the initiatory activities of the prose-
cution. Witnesses may be subpoenaed to testify and produce docu-
mentary evidence. It has the unlimited power to dismiss complaints
brought before it by returning no-true-bills and, conversely, may
indict despite the wishes of the prosecutor and, almost universally,
irrespective of the results of any preliminary examination which
may have been held before a magistrate. 44 Ordinarily, too, it may
indict on its own knowledge. The privacy of the grand jury room
and provisions for the secrecy of its proceedings are well known.
Any attempt by prosecutor or court to coerce action by the jurors
may be successfully resisted.45  An indictment found under such
coercion would be subject to quashing.46
The actual influence exerted by grand juries upon the course of
prosecution, however-and this is the key issue of the entire problem,
has long been the subject of widely differing opinions. Discounting
on the one hand extravagant eulogies of the institution couched
largely in terms of ideal potentialities and invoking memories of
the occasional historic instance, and on the other, more prosaic, but
decidedly sweeping assertions that grand juries exercise no inde-
pendent initiative whatever and are, in fact, but rubberstamps of
the prosecuting attorney, it is well to consider carefully what nature
of participation is desired from these lay juries-what, in short, the
standards of evaluation are to be.
In the first place, to what extent should a grand jury originate
cases in the first instance, as distinguished from merely considering
cases brought before it through bindover or by the prosecutor?
The power is ancient and unquestioned. 47 Charges to the grand jury
often conveyed an impression that twenty-three lay jurors might
be expected in a few weeks to out-do the combined efforts at crime
detecting and law enforcement of all the other agencies of prosecu-
tion combined. But since the advent of public prosecutors and
modern departments of police the initial task of uncovering crimes
deserving of prosecution is no longer considered the grand jury
44. Op. cit. supra note 5, at 704.
45. Shaftesbury's Case, supra note 17; In re The District Attorney's Rela-
tions to the Grand Jury, 14 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 431 (1900); THOMPSON AND MER-
REAM, JURIES (1882) § 597; Note (1895) 28 L. R. A. 367.
46. State v. Will, 97 Iowa 58, 65 N. W. 1010 (1896); Blau v. State, 82 Miss.
514, 34 So. 153 (1903).
47. 2 WrSON'S WORKS (Andrews ed. 1896) 213, 214.
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function that it once was in England. Under our system, origination
of charges by the grand jury must be the unusual sequence, as in
cases where the local authorities and in particular the prosecutor
should refuse to act. Or it may occur as a matter of convenience
when the first suspicion that certain charges should be brought
happens to come to light in the course of a grand jury investigation.
Then, too, the extent to -which a grand jury should roam afield in
search of crimes to be prosecuted is surely limited by the volume of
cases originated elsewhere and brought before them for consideration
-i.e., the routine which must have first claim on their attention.
Nor do our codes and decisions altogether favor inquiry by grand
juries "on their own." Bills for the services of private detectives
and investigators retained by grand juries to further their inde-
pendent investigation have been held void on policy grounds.48 Courts
have even intimated that such zeal on the part of jurors is unseemly
and indicative of "prejudice," not in keeping with the judicial nature
of their functions.49 The briefness of a typical grand jury term-
a few -weeks-has also its bearing on the general question. Grand
juries can be continued over or re-impanelled, to be sure, but a
leading argument for the information is the disinclination to spend
county money on the maintenance of grand juries!
When a case comes before a grand jury in any way,-and here
is the second question-how thoroughly are the jurors supposed to
inquire into the state of the evidence, how far substitute their judg-
ment for that of other agencies in the process? The prosecutor may
be expected to have an opinion. Should the case go on to trial it
will then receive its most thorough consideration. The grand jury
stage is, after all, no more than preliminary. The catch phrase
embodying its standard is but probable cause. Even ascribing to
grand juries the same "political" function so often ascribed to petit
juries-that of disregarding technical guilt where quasi-equities run
counter-it may still be asserted that a grand jury's function with
respect to accusation is simply to control prosecution in the ex-
ceptional case. Any other standard for grand jury conduct would
imply a decidedly pessimistic conception of prosecuting attorneys.
Our codes contemplate co6peration between grand jury and prose-
cutor.50 To him in the first instance and to the court in the second
the jurors are directed to turn for legal advice and experience.
48. (1922) 7 MINN. L. REv. 59; Note (1923) 26 A. L. R. 605; (1928) 12
MINN. L. REv. 761.
49. See Burns International Detective Agency v. Doyle, 46 Nev. 91, 95, 208
Pac. 427, 428 (1922); Burns International Detective Agency v. Holt, 138 Minn.
165, 167, 164 N. W. 590, 591 (1917).
50. Op. cit. supra note 5, at 697.
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With respect to the assertion that grand juries are through
domination by prosecutors reduced to the level of mere rubberstamps,
Professor Moley explains that "It seemed appropriate as a part of our
study to check this point with some degree of accuracy." 61 Dean
Morse accordingly prepared card forms calling for appropriate in-
formation on this matter to be filled out by prosecutors for each
case considered in the grand jury room. One hundred and sixty-two
prosecutors from twenty-one of the states requiring indictment in
major crimes cooperated. The largest number of reports were
returned from Illinois, Iowa, Ohio and New York. A total of 7,414
cases were reported.52 It turned out that 353 cases out of the lot
(4.76%) were initiated in the first instance by grand juries-and
most of these from Texas (85 cases out of a total of 627), Arkansas
(50 cases out of total for that state of 123), Kentucky, Ohio and
Mississippi. New York produced but 2 cases out of its total of 842.63
Of all these cases initiated by grand juries, 261 (73.94%) were non-
liquor cases and 92 (26.06%) liquor cases.54 The non-liquor charges
so initiated comprised 36 of grand larceny, 33 of forgery and fraud,
29 of assault, 18 of burglary, 8 of murder, and the balance of lesser
offenses such as non-support, desertions and breaches of the peace.6
In 6,453 out of the 7,414 cases the prosecutors expressed their
own preferences at to what disposition should have been made. Out
of 6,119 cases initiated by the prosecutors there was disagreement
between prosecutor and grand jury in 315.51 Of 334 cases initiated
by grand juries the action finally taken disagreed with the opinions
of the prosecutors in 33. 57 The percentage of disagreements is, in
total, 5.39%. Where disagreements occurred, the grand juries ap-
peared more often to lean in the direction of leniency58
It is necessary to differentiate between a certain majority group
of the cases going through the criminal law mill and the others.
The "open and shut" quality of this majority group is altogether
familiar. Most cases are not complicated. Absence of sufficient
proof or a clear case for conviction is usually apparent at the outset.
So it is that the overwhelming majority of cases are disposed of
before reaching a trial stage and that so large a percentage of the
convictions are arrived at through guilty pleas. It is this circum-
51. Op. cit. supra, note 8, at 414.





56. Id. at 151.
57. Id. at 152.
58. Id. at 151.
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stance which makes possible the predminence of plea-bargaining or
"administrative handling" in criminal law administration. In cases
of this group there could scarcely be many disagreements between
prosecutor and grand jury as to probable cause. There is probably
very little necessity or point in requiring grand jury consideration
in all these cases, felonies though they be, not because of rubber-
stamping but because agreement is practically inevitable. It is by
its record in those other cases-the small minority group-that the
.reputation of grand juries as indicting agencies should be made or
broken. Nothing in the data of the survey directed by Professor
Aloley bears directly on the issue of the actual value of grand jury
participation in cases of this minority group-the true and only
field for operation of "checks on prosecution" and "protection to
the accused." The prosecutors' reports indicate merely that in about
five per cent of the cases grand jury influence does unquestionably
alter the result.
As to the situation in the country generally and as to any pre-
vailing calibre of grand jury discretion and judgment we have no
direct or "objective" evidence. There is conflicting opinion gleaned
from individual experiences with grand juries. There are also
material differences from place to place in the methods provided for
the selection of grand jurors with respect to discretion on the part
of officials charged with the selection.50 Communities differ in their
attitudes toward juries and in the attitudes of the jurors toward
their duties. Aside from these differences, moreover, there are now
evidences here and there of a certain dynamic quality and modern-
izing growth in the ancient institution, sufficient perhaps to discount
the significance of static and generalized interpretations of grand
jury calibre however accurate on the basis of performance to date.
The reference is, of course, to the grand jurors' associations
established and functioning in a number of our most urban state
counties and federal districts, and to the Grand Jurors Federation
of America recently organized in Chicago by members of the Better
Government Association of that city. These represent a program
for supplementing fleeting and short-lived grand jury panels with
permanent, local, voluntary organizations which will instruct jurors
with respect to their.powers and possibilities, husband and bring
to bear through the panels an ever growing accumulation of ex-
perience, and offer some continuity of program in order that each
grand jury, although impanelled only for one month, may take up
some one item in addition to its routine.co
59. For a summary of the various statutes, consult id. at 226-239.




Were the case for the information rested solely in the issue thus
far considered-the relative potentialities of committing magistrates
and grand juries for controlling the discretion of prosecutors in
the initiatory stage of felony prosecution-it would seem to merit
at most a scotch verdict of "not proven." There are other objections
urged against indictment, however, comprising appeals to various
administrative values such as speed, economy, convenience and
efficiency. How do the procedures by indictment and information
compare on these scores?
Delay
"Many of the surveys contain more or less elaborate statistics upon the
time intervals between the various stages of the cases, as, for instance, the
time interval, in terms of number of days, between arrest and disposition
in the court of preliminary examination, arrest and grand jury indictment,
arrest and trial, arrest and disposition in the trial court and the like. Such
statistics are exceedingly difficult of trustworthy interpretation." 01
The stage in prosecution with which we are concerned ends with
arraignment in the trial court on an indictment or information.
Among the possible sequences of events leading up to this point sev-
eral may be considered: (1) The accused may have been first ar-
rested, with or without a warrant, next bound over by a magistrate
to await, either while out on bail or confined in the county jail,
action by the grand jury or by the prosecutor, and finally indicted
or had an information filed against him by the prosecutor; (2) the
finding of the indictment or filing of the information may have been
the first step, followed by arrest of the accused on a bench warrant,
after which there may or may not have been a preliminary examina-
tion; (3) extradition of the accused may have, intervened between
the lodging of a bharge against him, either before the magistrate
or by indictment or information, and the subsequent steps. In cases
following sequence (1)-by far the majority-a major time interval
is likely to be that from disposition in the preliminary hearing to
disposition by the grand jury or prosecutor. The contention is that
this period is generally less where prosecution is by information than
where it is by indictment, and that the process is accordingly ap-
preciably speeded up by eliminating the requirement of indictment.
For the very large cities, as it happens, these times intervals are
in any case very brief. Of cities where prosecution is by indictment,
New York exhibited intervals ranging from 12 to 15 days (median),
Chicago ranging from 13.3 to 15.9 days (median), Philadelphia, 18
61. Op. cit. supra note 9, at 71.
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days (median), and Cleveland, 18 days (average).02 Of cities where
prosecution is by either information or indictment, St. Louis exhibited
periods ranging from 17 to 24 (median number of days between
arrest and information or indictment), Milwaukee ranging from 7
to 14.5 (median), Detroit 8 days (median), Indianapolis 9 days
(median) and Los Angeles 20 days (median).03 A comparison of
these two groups seems to yield no preference for one mode of
initiation over the other, and in any case the periods appear reason-
ably brief. The explanation is obvious. Terms of court are more
frequent in the larger cities, grand juries more frequently impanelled.
In New York City, for example, grand juries are continuously in
session, the usual number being two or three in each county at a
time.
The disparity, if there be a significant one, between the speeds of
indictment and information, will accordingly be found in the smaller
cities and rural counties. For, here, terms of court are much less
frequent, and consequently grand juries not so often impanelled.
In the rural counties of New York, Illinois and Oregon, for example,
there are but two grand juries a year-not an unusual number.
Under these prevailing circumstances, it is argued, months are apt
to be wasted awaiting the coming of grand jury sessions in non-
metropolitan America. Professor Moley presents a comparison of
median time intervals from bindover to indictment with those from
bindover to information for non-metropolitan areas. Of indictment
jurisdictions, the rural counties and small cities of New York exhibit
median intervals ranging from 34 to 58 days; Illinois' seven less
urban counties a median interval ranging from 29 to 75 days and
her eight more urban counties ranging from 30 to 49.6 days; the
state of Pennsylvania as a whole, a median interval of 40 days.'
Of information jurisdictions Missouri's rural counties exhibit median
intervals between arrest on indictment or information ranging from
19 to 33 days; California's non-metropolitan counties a median in-
terval of 8 days (but this covers only those cases ending in conviction
by a jury); and Michigan's non-metropolitan counties a median
62. REPORT OF THE NEw YORK STATE CRDIm CoiitssroN (1928) 141, 142
(groups of cases classified in terms of final disposition); ILLINOIS CrtIE SURVEY
(1929) 97; Moley, op. cit. supra note 8, at 429; CRInINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVEL. U
(1922) 170.
63. These intervals are taken respectively from the MssouRi CRmm SURV
(1926) 329, 330; ILLINOIS CRInE SURVEY (1929) 97; Bloley, op. cit. aupra note 8,
at 429.
64. The intervals are taken respectively from the REPORT OF =n NEW YonR
STATE CRImE CowmIssION (1928) 141, 142; ILLINOIS CrIME SURVEY (1929) 97;
Moley, op. cit. supa& note 8, at 428.
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interval of 17 days (likewise covering only those cases ending in
conviction by a jury).6
This comparison unquestionably shows longer intervals for the
indictment states. But does it follow, as suggested by Professor
Moley, that "Data collected in the various surveys show forcefully
that the most important cause for delay is in the stage of procedure
in which action by grand jury is being awaited"? 10 The accused
must not only await indictment or information; he must also await
a term of court for an opportunity to be arraigned, plead, and be
tried, or, if the plea be guilty or nolo contendere, sentenced. Suppose
the wait for a grand jury is eliminated. There will ordinarily still
be a long wait for a term of court. For these terms are usually as
infrequent in rural counties as the impanelling of grand juries. The
latter are, after all, but "arms of the court." In brief, one would
expect a shortening of the interval from bindover to information
to be compensated by a lengthening of the interval between informa-
tion and arraignment.
How do the crime survey data bear out this hypothesis? The
largest median intervals between bindover and indictment were in
the grand jury states of New York and Illinois. But the median
intervals between indictment and arraignment in rural New York
for 1925 were only 4 days for one group of cases, and 6 for another;
for 1926 only 3 and 5 days respectively."T On the other hand,
for the thirty-six rural and partly urban counties of Missouri-an
information state relied upon by Professor Moley in his comparison
as exhibiting a very short interval between bindover and informa-
tion-the median periods from information (or indictment) to ar-
raignment are all of 20 and 43 days for 1922-24.8 A somewhat
similar check may be obtained by comparing the total time intervals
(arrest to final disposition) of indictment and information states.
Illinois, as a whole, shows median intervals ranging from 66.8 to
110.7 days, Pennsylvania as a whole ranging from 18 to 97 days,
and rural New York ranging from 52 to 71 days. 0 But the inform-
65. These intervals are taken respectively from the MISsoURI CRIblE SuRvEY
(1926) 329, 330; and Moley, op. cit. supra note 8, at 429.
66. Moley, op. cit. supra note 8, at 427.
67. Op. cit. supra note 9, at 217 (cases grouped in terms of final dispo-
sitions).
68. Ibid. These intervals are not exactly comparable with the foregoing,
however. Some cases initiated by indictment are included in the groups, and
the periods calculated seem to be those from indictment or information to the
date set for trial. See table XVI in the MissouRI CRIME SURVEY (1926) 329,
on which the table cited from the REPORT ON PROSECUTION is apparently based.
69. These intervals are taken respectively from the ILLINOIS CRIMiE SuRvEY
(1929) 94; REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CRIME
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ation state of Missouri shows median intervals of from 50 to 139
days.
70
Two changes in the procedure of indictment and information,
taken together, each of which has already been adopted in a few
jurisdictions, may indicate lines along which practicable plans for
eliminating delay in this stage are to be developed. The first of
these is provision for waiver of indictment. One might well expect
the result to be waivers in the great majority of cases. Demand
for grand jury consideration would presumably, like the demand for
a jury trial in states permitting waiver thereof, work out in prac-
tice as an exceptional move, and carry the same implication of a
more severe sentence in the event of conviction. At the same time
grand jury consideration would be available to the accused in the
very sort of exceptional situation, calculated to breed unfairness for
which grand juries are in theory designed. Provision for such
waiver was advocated by President Hoover in his Message to Con-
gress on Bank-uptcy and Crime, on February 29, 1932, and a bill
to that effect has passed the Senate and awaits action by the House
of Representatives.
71
The second type of change is found in a North Dakota statute
providing that a defendant bound over and prepared to plead guilty
may, on petition by the state's attorney, be brought before a district
judge sitting anywhere within the judicial district of which the
county is part, and that the defendant may thereupon be arraigned
before the district judge in chambers, may plead, and be sentenced
without waiting for a term of court.72
Expense
The data requisite to any comparative cost accounting in this field
is unavailable, save for certain reports secured by Dean Morse cov-
ering 244 counties in grand jury states and 49 in dual method (i.e.,
information) states, for the year 1928.J3 These were computed from
jurors' and witnesses' fees, mileage fees, bailiffs' fees, and in some
instances reporters' fees.74 Of counties of over 100,000 population,
CommISSION (1929) 61; and REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE CRIME COMIISSION
(1928) 141, 142.
70. MissouRi CRam SuRvuy (1926) 329.
71. Mitchell, Reform in Federal Crimiitl Procedure (1932) 18 A. B. A. J.
732, 733.
72. N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 10628 (6). See also similar English
developments discussed in the SECOND AND FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL Comt-
MISSION ON DELAY IN THE KINGS BENCH DIVISION (1913) 16 et seq.




those wherein indictment was required averaged a $5,834 expendi-
ture on grand juries, as against a $3,347 average for those wherein
indictment was not required; for counties of from 50,000 to 100,000
population the averages were $2,197 as against $579; for those of
25,000 to 50,000 population, $1,184 as against $633; and for those
of under 25,000 population, $550 as against $858. 75 These figures
cover, of course, but a few of the items which would figure in any
complete estimate of the cost of a requirement of indictment. As
Dean Morse suggests, one would have to pro-rate, amongst other
items, portions of the salaries and expenses of prosecutink attorneys,
judges, sheriffs, jailers, court attach6s and all others for whom in-
creased work is entailed by the use of indictment. 0 The expenses
of holding accused persons and material witnesses in jail, but only
to the extent that delay in these matters might be attributable to
the necessity for indictment, would be pertinent items. Expenses
traceable to grand jury blunders and inefficiencies-however im-
possible of estimation-would likewise have to be taken into ac-
count.7
7
Inroads on the time and energy of jurors and witnesses, entailed
by grand jury operation, are also specified as a ground of objection
to the requirement of indictment. In a county as busy as New York,
for example, a grand juror is apt to be called upon to devote five
mornings a week of two hours each for one month to the performance
of his duties. The extent to which this constitutes an unwarranted
inconvenience, however, is open to argument. Even in metropolitan
counties there are apparently citizens who can be voluntarily en-
listed in Grand Jurors Associations. One is inclined to refrain with
Monte Lemann from embracing the conclusion of the Wickersham
Commission that frequent jury terms without adjustments to the
exigencies of callings or business "call for more than the citizen
may reasonably be expected to do." 78
Efficiency
The claim is made that under an information system more of the
cases which will not ultimately go through to conviction are weeded
out before trial. This, according to Professor Moley, is one aspect
'75. Ibid.
76. Id. at 338.
77. Miller, Inform tions or Indictments in Felony Cases (1924) 8 MINN. L.
REv. 379, 387.
78. REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OP THE NATIONAL CO1M.MISSION ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (1931) 50.
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of the "efficiency" of prosecution which can, to a considerable de-
gree, be subjected to measurement:
"Our concern here is with one step; that wherein judgment is passed upon
cases at the 'information' or 'indictment' stage. To measure the 'efficiency'
of this step it is necessary to measure the extent to which it selects for
further prosecution really meritorious cases. This is indicated by the ratio
between the number of cases initiated, either by information or indictment,
and those carried through to a determination of guilt; in other words, by
the proportion of 'successful prosecutions.' 7
Before considering his tables of ratios showing the data for inform-
ation states contrasted with that for indictment states, the nature
of this test of "efficiency" requires some analysis.
The ultimate disposition of a case-where it turns out to be dis-
missal or acquittal instead of conviction---is thus taken as an indica-
tion that that case should never have been passed on to trial by
indictment found or information filed. Is this a satisfactory test
for action at the accusation stage? The degree of forseeability ap-
parently predicated is hopeful in the extreme. Dismissals at the
instance of the prosecution, whether by nolle or otherwise, may be
inspired by any number of motives scarcely ascertainable from a
court record. Acquittal or dismissal by direction of the court may
likewise result from a variety of circumstances. Witnesses may
have changed their testimony and thrown the case; a trial assistant
may have failed to make adequate preparation or to understand the
value of the evidence; the court may have misunderstood the facts
or taken an unexpected view of the law. As for acquittals by a jury
or by the court where no jury is used, the multiplicity of factors
relevant and irrelevant which contribute to the result is too unfa-
miliar to require particular discussion. And yet these eventual
results, without relation to explanations and contributing circum-
stances, are offered as tests of action at the earlier grand jury or
information stage.
It may still be urged that true-billing or filing an information is
"inefficient" when an acquittal or dismissal will later follow defects
in the state's case which were in existence even at that preliminary
stage. This contention is, however, somewhat at odds with our
schemes of initiating prosecution. Consider a grand jury: it is
charged to indict when it finds probable cause. The defendant is
privileged against being called to tell his story, and even should he
so desire, our codes do not contemplate his being permitted to appear
before the grand jury as a regular practice. Prosecutors, more-
79. Op. cit. supra note 8, at 416.
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over, usually try to discourage a too zealous grand jury from "trying
the case" at this preliminary stage. Consider preliminary hearing
under an information system: when there is contest, complete dis-
closure of the defense case before trial is again scarcely contem-
plated by our procedure. Even when the examination is or must
be held, the defense is not required to present its evidence, and in
practice rarely does so. To what extent in any case should a prose-
cutor substitute his judgment for that of the triers of fact? Beyond
generalities in terms of probable cause and prima facie case, set
standards in these matters are none too familiar. To use the state
of the evidence as developed at trial as a basis for judging the effi-
ciency of action by the agencies of initiation is to beg a great many
questions.
Any conclusion unfavorable to grand juries on the basis of this
test, moreover,'seems to involve showing that they exert an appre-
ciable influence on the disposition of cases at this stage-a possi-
bility which Professor Moley elsewhere repudiates.8 0 But, taking
the view that they do exert an influence, is there any evidence that
it is predominantly in the direction of true-billing cases that the
prosecutor would rather dismiss? On the contrary, the data indi-
cated, as expressed by Dean Morse, that "the prosecutors disagreed
much more often when the grand juries 'not true-billed' than when
they 'true-billed'." 81 Out of a total of 6453 cases in which prose-
cutors reported their opinions on the grand jury dispositions, they
disagreed in 19.51% of the cases initiated by themselves in which
the grand juries not true-billed, but only in 2.53% of these cases
which the grand juries true-billed.82
So much for the data adduced as to disagreements between prose-
cutors and grand juries. It scarcely inclines one toward a belief
that grand juries pass on more cases to trial than would the prose-
cutors. It may still be argued, of course, that grand juries, by their
very presence, lead prosecutors to feel differently about dropping
cases at this stage than they would under an information system.
As to this, of course, there can be no proof. Professor Moley offers
tables, however, showing ratios of "successful prosecutions" to in-
formations returned, ranging from 50 -79 for five information
states, the average ratio being 67.83 His range of ratios for four
indictment states is from 46 - 57, the average being 52.84 But the
five information states used are predominantly agricultural, whereas
80. Id. at 430.
81. Morse, op. cit. supra note 52, at 151.
82. Id. at 151, 153.
83. Id. at 313.
84. Id. at 313.
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the four indictment states include three of the most populous in the
country. Moreover, as one commentator has pointed out, "what
would happen to Dr. Moley's statistics, if he selected 5 Indianas and
4 Virginias" for comparison? 11 The ratio for Indiana (informa-
tion) was 50, for Virginia (indictment) 57, and for Pennsylvania
(indictment) 54.
Procedural Hazards
...... the requirement of indictment by a grand jury in all prosecutions
for infamous crimes involves a number of needless procedural difficulties
which do not obtain in a regime of prosecution by information." So
The various requirements as to organization of a grand jury and
the necessity for going through the process of impanelling again
and again in each county or district, presupposed by the current
system of using grand juries in indictment jurisdictions, involves
more or less inevitably the occurrence of irregularities in their draw-
ing and composition. This particular hazard is of course obviated
under the information procedure whereby single magistrates are
substituted for these relays of relatively complicated lay agencies.
But without eliminating the requirement of indictment there is still
a wide range within which the trouble and waste occasioned may be
enhanced or minimized as rules of practice with respect to these
irregularities are designed to the one end or without regard to the
other.
Grand juries have frequently been operated under rules extrava-
gantly conceived in their tolerance of defense tactics of a sort re-
cently commented upon by Attorney General Mitchell:
"Mlany instances have occurred where indictments returned after long and
expensive hearings have been invalidated by the discovery of the presence
on the grand jury of a single ineligible juror. Often the objection is not
sustained until the case reaches an appellate court, and meanwhile the
Statute of Limitations may have barred another indictment. Delays in
raising the objection are deliberately incurred to allow the Statute to
run." 87
But they may also be operated under rules of a sort proposed in
a bill now pending in Congress. It provides that a motion to quash
an indictment because of irregularity in drawing or impanelling a
grand jury, or upon the ground of disqualification of a grand juror,
85. Hall, Analysis of Criticism of the Grand Jury (1932) 22 J. Cra. L.
AND CRIr. 692, 702.
86. Op. cit. supra note 9, at 36.
87. Mitchell, op. cit. supra note 71, at 734.
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must be made before or within ten days after the defendant is pre-
sented for arraignment; that where such a motion is made, the
running of the Statute shall be tolled until the termination of the
term of court next subsequent to final judgment on the motion;
and that an indictment is not to be quashed upon the ground of the
presence of an unqualified juror, if it appears that twelve or more
qualified jurors concurred in finding the indictment.88
Other dilatory and technical objections associated with grand
juries and used as arguments for the elimination of the require-
ment of indictment give rise to quite similar considerations. The
very narrow scope within which amendment of indictments has been
permitted, the readiness to quash where a third party has been
present in the grand jury room, the practice of reviewing the evi-
dence before the grand jury on motion to quash which arose in
some of our jurisdictions along with the innovation of keeping grand
jury minutes,8 9 the construction placed on New York's guaranty
of indictment in People ex rel. Battista v. Christian to render invalid
a statute designed to permit waiver,00 and the general tendency to
treat many irregularities in grand jury procedure as jurisdictional
-are these not the expressions of a certain procedural attitude
which happens to have co-existed with and been imposed upon grand
jury operation rather than conditions inherent other than histori-
cally in the employment of citizen§' groups to supervise and check
the discretion of a prosecutor before trial?
In contrast with this procedural environment which has imparted
its style to the grand jury, contrast that which chances to co-exist
with and garb the information procedure: "The whole system of
procedure by information is subject to control and regulation by
the legislature." I" That the respective environmental attitudes
might quite conceivably be reversed is suggested on the one hand
by the federal bill referred to above, the refusal of many courts to
grant inspection of grand jury minutes and review the evidence in
all cases,92 the gradual enactment of provisions authorizing waiver
of indictment,93 the manner in which grand juries have been insu-
lated against dilatory and technical objections on the part of wit-
nesses even in a John Doe investigation; 04 and on the other by the
88. Ibid.
89. Kidd, op. cit. supra note 34.
90. 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. 111 (1928).
91. People v. Foster, 198 Cal. 112, 122, 243 Pac. 667, 671 (1926).
92. Kidd, op. cit. supra note 34.
93. Notes (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 206; (1928) 28 COL. L. R.v. 976.
94. See Carroll v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 951, 953 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927);
Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919).
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quite plausible view of the requirement of preliminary examination
under an information system taken by the California Court in People
v. Nogir, quoted above, and by the practice in some information
states of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence before the magis-
trate on motion to set aside the information and again on appeal
from a conviction-bewailed by a note writer as making the pre-
liminary examination into "another loophole for the criminal, and
another pitfall for the prosecution." 95
COLLATERAL FUNCTIONS OF THE GRAD JURY 00
Exaggerated as the contentions in favor of information as against
indictment on the foregoing debit items of expense and trouble finally
appear, there remains some difference and, such as it is, doubtless
in favor of the information. Our main issue, however, involves
something further-an inquiry into what, under each of these com-
peting modes of initiating felony prosecution, we get in return for
the respective expenditures of money, time and energy entailed.
Quasi-judicial review and control of a district attorney's discretion
in the initiatory stage-the only grand jury role for which equiva-
lents under the information have thus far been discussed-is but
one of several major services in the course of law enforcement per-
formed by regular grand juries.
To the prosecution, for example, a grand jury affords an early,
secret, and ex parte hearing, where unwilling or timid witnesses
may be subpoened and questioned before or after the lodging of a
specific charge against anyone, and under the circumstances most
favorable to disclosure. Barring an occasional "leak", no prema-
ture disclosure of the state's case is entailed. Persons called before
such a body have the vulnerable status of mere witnesses. They are
unattended by counsel. The value of such a "deposition mill" is
constantly attested by federal prosecutors and by continued reliance
on optional grand juries for this purpose in some of the informa-
tion states.
Grand juries have also long been distinguished with substantial
though not absolute accuracy as "the only general criminal inquisi-
torial bodies known to the law." Where suspicion of crime but as
yet no sufficient evidence to substantiate primna facie charges against
particular offenders is the situation, a John Doe inquiry is the form
of proceeding indicated. To reach its maximum effectiveness such
95. Note (1930) 28 MICH. L. REv. 451.
96. For references on which this section is based, see Dession and Cohen,
op. cit. supra note 5.
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an inquiry must be served by the power to subpoena witnesses and
compel the production of evidence. This is traditionally a grand
jury r6le, shared in its completeness by no other agency. The extent
to which positive law enforcement is dependent upon the availability
of this type of inquiry is evidenced by the recurring investiture of
the innumerable administrative and regulatory boards and commis-
sions of today with similar powers in aid of their respective func-
tions. A John Doe investigation may be required to build up an
isolated criminal case, or it may serve to uncover a whole organized
system of corruption. A history of grand jury activity in this
country would be one long chronicle of instances of both.
There has been no discrediting of these investigative or "deposi-
tion mill" activities of grand juries. If they are to be lost, any
promised benefits from a shift to the information must be offset to
that extent. If they are not to be lost, some considered substitution
should form an integral part of the case for the information. Legis-
lation setting up the method for initiating prosecution by informa-
tion has, to be sure, uniformly retained the possibility of im-
panelling optional grand juries on motion of the prosecutor or
court. In a few of the information states, notably Missouri,
Indiana and Iowa, the prosecution has kept such grand juries
in frequent session to avail of the power to subpoena and ex-
amine witnesses in secret and get their testimony on record
at an early stage. But more generally the adoption of an in-
formation system has meant the disappearance of grand juries
and with them the facilities embodied in grand jury powers. This
has been the experience of Connecticut, Michigan, Nebraska, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin. The procedure is soon forgotten. A grand
jury that must be specially impanelled is not sufficiently available
for everyday needs. The unusual expense to the county is apt to
prove a deterrent. Prosecutors come into office who have never
known grand jury practice, and naturally enough a habit of getting
along without grand jury process sooi becomes the rule. In an
exceptional or difficult case where a prosecutor is loath to take all
responsibility for initiating a prosecution, or for purposes of an
unusual, widespread investigation, an optional grand jury may be
impanelled. These are the only instances of its use in Connecticut,
for example, and they are rare indeed. Dean Morse quotes a Michi-
gan judge for the statement that "Under our state laws, no grand
jury is summoned, except by special order of circuit judge. In this
county there has been no grand jury sitting for upwards of thirty
years." From a Wisconsin judge: "Since 1880 but one grand jury
was called in this circuit. It did not accomplish anything." From
a Washington judge: "Since I have been on the bench, 25 years,
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we have had only two or three grand juries, hence my observation
has been so limited as to be of little value." From a Nebraska jus-
tice: "We have had no experience in the selection of grand juries.
The grand jury system in Nebraska, while available, in practice is
used only to meet exceptional circumstances." 07
At this point one may well ask how it is that prosecutors in such
states consider themselves quite able to get along without the sub-
poena power and ex parte hearing afforded by grand juries, while
in the federal jurisdictions and many grand jury states these facili-
ties are deemed of the utmost importance, if not conditions precedent
to vigorous enforcement of the criminal law? It is interesting to
speculate on the effects of throwing the entire burden of criminal
investigation on prosecutors and police while at the same time with-
holding from them the legal means of compulsion embodied in grand
jury powers. In predominantly rural counties prosecution is, for
the most part, of course, confined to rather simple police business
of an "open and shut" variety. But in the cities and, above all, in
the federal jurisdictions, more complicated situations are often in-
volved. The lack of an investigatory procedure with "teeth" may
well be felt. It seems not unlikely that the lack of legal means for
compelling testimony and the unavailability of investigatory process
will be compensated by extension of such sub rosa practices as that
of holding suspects incommunicado for questioning of a "third-
degree" or "quasi-third degree" character. The questioning of
witnesses in the prosecutor's office is likely to develop in the same
direction. Failing these developments, are not prosecutors likely
to confine themselves more and more to those charges brought up
and cases practically prepared by the police-i.e., to adopt a policy
of not looking for trouble?
There is, indeed, the alternative of lodging grand jury powers
elsewhere, and setting up substitutes for these phases of grand jury
activity in the information states. Connecticut offered the first ex-
ample, with its provision for the conduct of John Doe inquiries into
crime by three justices of the peace or three grand jurors of a town.
The possibility has, however, been but rarely invoked. Michigan
has for some years had provision for similar investigations by "one
man grand juries," consisting of justices invested with inquisitorial
power. A few other states have similar provisions, empowering
either justices or prosecuting attorneys to exercise these grand jury
functions. But these "one man grand juries" are still too exceptional
to be viewed as integral parts of the information system of prose-
cution. Even where authorized, it turns out that they are but rarely
97. Morse, op. cit. supra note 52, at 223, n. 116.
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utilized, save in a few localities as a convenient means ,of evading
the privilege against self-incrimination-the John Doe form serving
to cloak the calling as a mere witness of a suspect against whom
prosecution was contemplated from the start.
For one reason or another these statutory substitutes for grand
juries have not materialized as genuine substitutes in practice. The
recent development in Michigan-the jurisdiction of the most pub-
licized "one man grand jury"-of six months grand juries in all
well-populated counties, in order that the facilities of John Doe in-
quiry and the ex iparte hearing of subpoenaed witnesses might be
readily available, is of interest in this connection. 98 These again are
isolated instances. The American Law Institute's draft Code of
Criminal Procedure would require the impanelling of a grand jury
at least once a year in each county, presumably not for an entire
year, nor again for six months, but rather for the usual period of
a term of court. During the other terms of court--assuming more
than one per annum-the provision continues to be one for merely
."optional" grand juries. This rather uncertain recognition of the
possible value of some grand jury uses is suggestive of the Wicker-
sham Commission's conclusion that the grand jury is still useful
as a general investigating body and "should be retained as an oc-
casional instrument for such purposes," that is, for inquiry "into
the conduct of public officers and in case of large conspiracies." 0c
But as has been suggested, this quite overlooks the importance of
grand jury facilities in the everyday investigation and preparation
of more ordinary cases.
While shortcomings of the evidence adduced in support of con-
tentions as to grand jury rubberstamping, expense and procedural
hazards may be taken to discredit the case constructed for the in-
formation, they also suggest the existence of some other appeal to
account for the widespread support accorded the information pro-
cedure. This appeal seems to lie in that distinctive feature of the
information procedure which from some points of view would con-
stitute its chief defect-the wider discretion and power enjoyed
under it by the district attorney.
There is a growing demand for assumption of ever greater re-
sponsibility by the agencies of prosecution, fostered by the recog-
nition of plea-bargaining and administrative handling as existing
practices and by the recognition that more is involved in criminal
98. See Toy, Michigan's New Law For Sio. Months &rand Juries (1932) 10
THE PANnt. No. 1, at 3.
' 99. Op. cit. supra note 9, at 37.
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law administration than the dealing out of "penalties to fit the
crime." The "socialization" of our procedure for dealing with per-
sons accused of crime or delinquency, if one may judge by that out-
standing modern development-the juvenile court-unquestionably
presupposes an unprecedented reliance on the discretion of officials
in charge.100 The juvenile court procedure is, moreover, often re-
garded as pointing the line along which the handling of adults accused
of crime is to develop.
100. Cf. People v. Lewis, 235 App. Div. 559 (3d Dep't 1932); Vau Waters,
Socialization of Juvenile Court Proccdure (1922) 13 J. CRIe. LAW AND CnItX.
61, 64; Waite, How Far Can Court Proccduc be Socialized (1922) 12 T. CilIT.
LAw AND Cmi. 339.
